Qadariyyah and Jabriyyah: The Free Will Debate

The two opposite extreme positions on the doctrine of qadar. The Qadariyyah who attributed action entirely to humans; the Jabriyyah who attributed it entirely to Allah. The mainstream Sunni position that affirmed both human responsibility and divine sovereignty without collapsing one into the other.

A Question That Will Not Resolve Itself

The relationship between divine determination and human action is one of the most enduringly difficult questions in religious thought. Across traditions, the question has produced extensive engagement, with positions oscillating between attributing too much to one side and attributing too much to the other. Islamic theology has not been exempt from this difficulty; the early centuries of Muslim thought produced two opposite extreme schools that addressed the question in fundamentally different ways.

The Qadariyyah held that humans create their own actions independently — that human freedom requires separating human action from any divine causation, and that the doctrine of qadar (divine determination) must be reinterpreted to preserve genuine human responsibility. The Jabriyyah held the opposite — that humans do not really act at all, that all action belongs to Allah, and that the appearance of human agency is illusory. The two positions, taken to their logical conclusions, produce theology and ethics that look quite different from each other.

The mainstream Sunni position emerged between these extremes. It affirmed both divine sovereignty (against the Qadariyyah) and human responsibility (against the Jabriyyah), holding that both must be preserved without collapsing one into the other. The position is intellectually demanding — it does not pretend to resolve every philosophical difficulty — but it preserves what scripture establishes about both dimensions.

This day's reading examines both extreme positions, the mainstream response, and what the Sunni position has held about the difficult dimensions of the question.

The Qadariyyah

The Qadariyyah (sometimes called the Mu'tazilah's position on free will, though the relationship between the two schools is complex) held that humans create their own actions. The classical formulation was that the human is khaliq af'alih — the creator of his actions. Allah does not determine specific human actions; humans determine them themselves through their own causation.

The reasoning was driven by a specific theological concern: the question of justice. If Allah determines that a person will commit specific sins and then punishes them for those sins, the punishment seems unjust. The Qadariyyah insisted that justice required genuine human agency — humans must be the actual causes of their own actions for the consequences (reward or punishment) to be just.

This position involved several specific moves. The doctrine of qadar, which the Quran and sunnah establish in strong terms, was reinterpreted. Verses that describe Allah determining outcomes were read as referring to Allah's general decree about the laws of nature rather than to specific human actions. Verses that attribute actions to Allah were read metaphorically. The hadith literature on qadar, which is extensive, was selectively engaged with, with the more difficult passages either reinterpreted or treated with reservation.

The practical implications were specific. The believer's actions, on this analysis, are entirely up to them. There is no sense in which Allah is "behind" their actions in any causal way; the believer alone is responsible. This produces a strong sense of moral agency — the believer has full ownership of their actions and their consequences.

But the position also produced specific theological problems. If Allah does not determine human actions, then He does not have full sovereignty over what occurs in His creation; major events involving human action proceed without His direct determination. The Quranic texts that affirm Allah's complete sovereignty over all things become difficult to maintain. The believer's prayer for guidance, which assumes Allah can guide, becomes problematic — what would Allah be doing in guiding if humans are entirely the cause of their own choices? The believer's recognition that all blessings come from Allah, including the ability to do good, becomes problematic — if humans are the sole cause of their actions, the credit for their good actions is theirs alone.

These problems were noted by the broader Muslim community. The early Sunni response — articulated in various texts — was that the Qadariyyah, in their attempt to preserve justice through emphasising human agency, had compromised divine sovereignty in ways that the Quranic and prophetic teaching did not allow. The Prophet ﷺ had reportedly said: "The Qadariyyah are the Magians of this Ummah." The reference to the Magians (Zoroastrians) is significant — Zoroastrianism posits two ultimate principles (good and evil) rather than one, and the Qadariyyah were charged with effectively positing two creators (Allah for one set of things, humans for their actions) rather than one.

The Jabriyyah

The Jabriyyah held the opposite extreme. They held that humans have no genuine agency — that all action is created by Allah and that humans are essentially passive instruments. The classical formulation was that humans are majbur — compelled, without genuine free will. The appearance that humans choose their actions is illusory; the actual causation belongs entirely to Allah.

The reasoning was driven by a different theological concern: the question of divine sovereignty. If humans genuinely create their own actions, then there are events in creation that Allah does not directly determine. This compromises Allah's complete sovereignty. The Jabriyyah insisted that complete divine sovereignty required attributing all action to Allah; humans do not really act in the genuine sense.

This position also involved specific moves. Verses that attribute actions to humans were read as referring only to the appearance of action, not to genuine causation. Verses about reward and punishment were treated as Allah's decree about what He will do (regardless of whether the human "really" deserves it in any independent sense). The notion of human responsibility was substantially weakened.

The practical implications were specific and disturbing. If humans do not really act, then they do not really deserve reward or punishment in any robust sense. The framework of moral accountability becomes problematic. The believer's striving to do good becomes theologically odd — they cannot really strive, because they cannot really act. The whole apparatus of religious life — the commands and prohibitions, the encouragement and warning, the categories of obedience and disobedience — becomes formal rather than substantive.

The mainstream Sunni response to the Jabriyyah was equally firm. The Quran is full of verses that address humans as agents — commanding them, praising them for obedience, blaming them for disobedience, calling on them to choose between paths. The whole apparatus of revealed guidance assumes that humans really act and that their actions really matter. The Jabriyyah position, in attempting to preserve divine sovereignty, had effectively rendered the religious life incoherent.

The Prophet's ﷺ teaching included specific elements that contradicted Jabriyyah positions. He commanded specific actions and forbade specific actions — assuming that the addressees could actually do or not do what was being commanded or forbidden. He distinguished between sins committed in genuine ignorance (which are excused) and sins committed in awareness (which are not) — the distinction makes sense only if there is a genuine difference between deliberate and non-deliberate action. The whole structure of his teaching presupposed real human agency, which the Jabriyyah denied.

The Mainstream Sunni Position

The mainstream Sunni position emerged between these extremes through the work of multiple scholars across the second through fourth centuries AH. The position is sometimes summarised in the phrase amr bayna amrayn (a matter between two matters) — affirming both divine sovereignty and human agency without collapsing one into the other.

Several specific elements:

Allah is the creator of all things, including human actions. The Quranic verse is explicit: "Allah is the Creator of all things" (39:62). Human actions are among "all things"; Allah is their Creator in the foundational sense. The believer cannot maintain that some things in creation are not from Allah; everything is from Him.

But humans are the actors of their own actions in a meaningful sense. Allah creates humans with specific capacities — to know, to choose, to act. Humans, exercising these capacities, perform actions that are genuinely their own in the relevant sense. The technical formulation has been that Allah creates human actions but humans acquire (kasaba) them. The Arabic verb kasaba (and its forms) appears extensively in the Quran in this exact context — "Each soul earns (taksib) only against itself..." (6:164), "That is what their hearts have earned (kasabat)..." (5:70), and many others.

The relationship between divine creation and human acquisition is not fully transparent. The mainstream Sunni position has not claimed to fully resolve the relationship between Allah's creation of human actions and humans' acquisition of them. The position has been that scripture establishes both sides; the philosophical resolution between them is partly beyond human understanding. This is consistent with the Day 85 principle of epistemological humility — the believer affirms what scripture affirms while acknowledging that some dimensions are not fully accessible to human understanding.

Human responsibility is real. Whatever the philosophical difficulties, the mainstream position holds that human responsibility is genuine. The believer is responsible for their actions in the relevant sense; the religious framework of commands, prohibitions, reward, and punishment is substantive. The doctrine of qadar does not undermine this; both are simultaneously affirmed.

Allah's justice is preserved. The mainstream position holds that Allah is just — the Quran establishes this directly. His decree about human actions is consistent with His justice. The believer who is punished is not being treated unjustly; they have done what they have done, in the relevant sense, even though Allah's broader sovereignty is also operating. The believer who is rewarded is being shown Allah's mercy through the framework of justice that He has established.

The believer's proper response is action paired with trust. The doctrine of qadar does not produce paralysis. The believer acts as if their actions matter (because they do, in the relevant sense), while trusting Allah for outcomes (because outcomes ultimately are His). This combination — substantive engagement with one's responsibilities while ultimate trust in Allah — is the practical orientation that the doctrine produces.

The Practical Implications

Several specific practical implications follow from the mainstream position.

For one's own efforts. The believer should pursue their religious obligations seriously, work hard at what they are responsible for, and treat their effort as actually mattering. The doctrine of qadar does not justify passivity. Imam al-Ghazali addresses this directly in Ihya: the believer who refuses to seek medical treatment because Allah will heal whom He wills has misunderstood qadar; they should seek treatment because Allah's healing typically operates through means, and pursuing means is what humans are responsible for. The same applies across all domains — work, study, family obligations, religious practice.

For one's response to outcomes. When outcomes are favourable, the believer should attribute them to Allah's blessing, not to their own causation alone. When outcomes are unfavourable, the believer should accept them as part of Allah's wisdom, not as failure of their own efforts alone. The orientation maintains both — proper effort followed by acceptance of results.

For one's response to others' failures. The believer should not blame others as if they were the sole causes of their failures, but should also not excuse them as if they had no agency at all. The mainstream position holds others responsible for their actions in the relevant sense, while recognising that the broader context (including Allah's decree) is also operating.

For one's response to one's own failures. The believer who has failed should take responsibility for the failure — they did what they did, in the relevant sense — while also recognising that the failure occurred within Allah's broader decree. This produces healthy responsibility (not denying one's role) without despair (not treating the failure as if it were entirely up to one alone).

For prayer and supplication. Prayer makes sense within the mainstream framework. The believer asks Allah for what they need, knowing that Allah is the ultimate source of what occurs. They also work toward what they need, knowing that human effort is what they are responsible for. The two combine without conflict — supplication and effort together.

The Hadith of the Two Hands

A specific hadith captures something of the mainstream position concretely. The Prophet ﷺ taught a supplication that the believer would say: "Allahumma innaka 'afuwwun karim, tuhibbu al-'afwa fa'fu 'anni" — "O Allah, You are the One who pardons abundantly, You love to pardon, so pardon me." But this is only one of many du'as the Prophet ﷺ taught.

In another famous teaching, when a Bedouin asked the Prophet ﷺ whether he should leave his camel untied and trust in Allah, or tie it and then trust, the Prophet ﷺ said: "Tie it and then trust in Allah." The teaching captures the mainstream framework. The believer takes substantive action (ties the camel — exercises their agency, does their part) and then trusts Allah for outcomes (recognising that the camel's safety ultimately depends on Allah's decree). Either alone — the trust without the tying, or the tying without the trust — would be insufficient. The combination is what the believer is taught.

This hadith has been one of the most cited in Sunni discussions of the relationship between human action and divine decree. It captures the mainstream position concretely — the believer acts substantively while trusting fully, without collapsing either dimension into the other.

What This Teaches

Several lessons emerge.

The Question Does Not Fully Resolve Philosophically

The relationship between divine sovereignty and human agency is not fully resolved philosophically. The mainstream Sunni position has not pretended to resolve it; it has affirmed what scripture affirms about both sides while acknowledging that the philosophical dimensions are partly beyond human understanding. This is the proper position — engaging with what scripture establishes rather than forcing resolution that scripture does not provide.

Both Extremes Produce Specific Distortions

The Qadariyyah preserved justice at the cost of divine sovereignty; the Jabriyyah preserved divine sovereignty at the cost of human responsibility. Both produced specific theological distortions that the mainstream position avoids. This illustrates a pattern — extreme positions often achieve their preferred goal at the cost of something else important; balanced positions preserve more of what is at stake.

The Practical Orientation Is Substantive

The mainstream position produces a substantive practical orientation — substantive effort paired with substantive trust, real responsibility paired with real submission, action paired with acceptance. This is not vague compromise but specific orientation that shapes the believer's life in practical ways.

Acknowledging Mystery Is Mature

The willingness to affirm both sides while acknowledging that their full integration is partly beyond human understanding is a mature theological move. It avoids both the false confidence of forcing resolution and the despair of refusing to engage with the question. This is the same epistemological humility we examined on Day 85, applied specifically to the doctrine of qadar.

The Four Levels of Qadar

A specific feature of the mainstream Sunni articulation of qadar is the four levels (maratib) that the doctrine encompasses. Classical scholars including Ibn al-Qayyim and others have systematically articulated these levels; understanding them clarifies what the mainstream position actually affirms.

*The level of knowledge (al-'ilm). Allah's knowledge is comprehensive across all time. He has known eternally everything that will occur — every action, every event, every detail of His creation across its entire existence. Nothing escapes His knowledge; nothing surprises Him; nothing is unknown to Him. This is the foundation of qadar* — His knowledge of what will be is part of what makes the doctrine meaningful.

*The level of writing (al-kitabah). The Prophet ﷺ taught that Allah commanded the Pen to write everything that would occur. This is mentioned in multiple authentic hadiths; the writing of decree precedes creation. The Quranic verse: "Indeed, all things We created with predestination"* (54:49). The believer who understands this level recognises that what occurs has been pre-recorded — not as a constraint on humans but as Allah's prior knowledge being made manifest.

*The level of will (al-mashi'ah). Allah wills what occurs. The Quran is explicit: "And you do not will except that Allah wills"* (76:30). His will is encompassing; what He wills occurs, and what He does not will does not occur. This level is sometimes the most difficult for the believer to engage with — the awareness that Allah wills both the favourable and the unfavourable, both the believer's good actions and (in the foundational sense) their failures. The mainstream position holds this firmly while distinguishing it from the Jabri error: Allah's will encompasses without compelling, in the philosophical sense the mainstream tradition has worked with.

*The level of creation (al-khalq). Allah creates what occurs. "Allah is the Creator of all things"* (39:62). Including human actions. This is what distinguishes the mainstream position from the Qadari position — the Qadariyyah denied that Allah creates human actions; the mainstream position affirms that He does, while also affirming that humans are the actors of those actions in the relevant sense.

These four levels — knowledge, writing, will, creation — together constitute the doctrine of qadar as the mainstream tradition articulates it. The believer who has internalised them affirms a robust doctrine of divine sovereignty across all dimensions while also affirming the human responsibility that scripture establishes alongside it.

For modern Muslims, working through these four levels (with appropriate sources, perhaps Ibn al-Qayyim's treatment in Shifa al-'Alil, or simpler contemporary articulations) deepens engagement with the doctrine substantially. It moves from the simple binary of "do humans have free will" to the structured affirmation of multiple dimensions that the doctrine actually encompasses.

The Hadith of Jibril Revisited

We examined the Hadith of Jibril extensively in Q1 — particularly its three-fold structure of islam, iman, and ihsan. But the hadith has a specific feature directly relevant to today's reading: the sixth pillar of iman that Jibril asked about was qadar, "the good of it and the bad of it" (khayrihi wa sharrih).

The phrasing is deliberate. Jibril did not ask whether the believer believes in qadar in a vague general sense; he specified "the good of it and the bad of it." The believer who only believes in qadar in the favourable cases — when good things happen, attributing them to Allah — has not yet grasped the doctrine. The doctrine extends to unfavourable cases as well — when difficulties occur, when one's own failures occur, when others' actions cause harm. All of this is within qadar; all is part of what Allah has known, written, willed, and created (in the foundational sense).

This expansive reach of qadar is what the mainstream position holds. It is not just about good outcomes; it is about all outcomes. The believer's response to difficult outcomes is shaped by this — they are not random misfortunes but parts of the larger pattern that Allah has decreed for reasons that are sometimes accessible to human understanding and sometimes not.

The phrase khayrihi wa sharrih (the good of it and the bad of it) is carefully constructed. It does not say that qadar itself is good and bad; qadar as Allah's decree is entirely good in itself. It says that what qadar encompasses includes both what humans experience as good and what humans experience as bad. From the divine perspective, all of it is part of His perfect wisdom. From the human perspective, some of it is favourable and some unfavourable. The believer's task is to accept qadar across this full range, not just in the favourable cases.

For modern Muslims navigating real difficulties — illness, loss, professional setbacks, relational struggles, the political and social challenges of the contemporary world — this dimension of qadar is particularly relevant. The believer who has internalised that qadar extends to "the good of it and the bad of it" engages with difficulty differently than the believer who has only the favourable-cases understanding. The difficulty does not become easier by virtue of being in qadar, but it becomes meaningful — part of the pattern that Allah is constructing across the believer's life rather than meaningless misfortune to be resented.

A Closing Reflection

The early debates between Qadariyyah and Jabriyyah were among the most intense theological controversies of the early centuries. The mainstream Sunni position that emerged — affirming both divine sovereignty and human agency while acknowledging that their full philosophical integration is partly beyond human understanding — has held across the centuries as the standard articulation.

For modern Muslims, the doctrine of qadar in its mainstream Sunni form is what should be held. The two extreme positions — that humans create their actions independently, or that humans do not really act at all — both produce specific distortions that the mainstream tradition has consistently rejected. The mainstream position is intellectually demanding in that it does not provide a clean philosophical resolution, but it preserves what the Quran and sunnah establish on both sides of the question.

May Allah grant us the proper orientation toward this difficult doctrine. May He grant us substantive engagement with our responsibilities, paired with substantive trust in His decree. May He preserve us from the Qadari error of imagining that we are the sole authors of our actions, and from the Jabri error of imagining that we have no agency at all. May He grant us the balanced understanding that produces both serious effort and serious submission, both proper responsibility and proper acceptance. Amin.